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Abstract This article questions the common assumptions in legal theory regarding 
Derrida’s well-known Declarations of Independence. Through a close reading of this 
text, well-known ground such as the relation between speech and writing, the notion 
of representation, speech act theory, the signature, and the proper name is covered. 
The contribution that this analysis makes in the present context lies in the additional 
‘step’ that it takes. The article seeks to give an explanation of the laws at work in 
Derrida’s thinking in the above respects and to explain more specifically how they 
find expression in Declarations of Independence. The article in this regard also 
investigates the importance and role of the ‘notions’ of death, loss of meaning, loss of 
ownership, and loss of sovereignty in Derrida’s thinking. The contention is that if we 
take account of Derrida’s reading in Declarations of Independence, it is possible to 
view constitutions in a very different way, more specifically their ‘origins’, with 
inevitable implications for constitutional interpretation.  
 
Keywords constitution, Derrida, interpretation, iterability, justice, proper name, 
representation, signature, sovereignty, speech acts 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The importance for constitutional theory of Jacques Derrida’s 1976 essay 
Declarations of Independence1 has been acknowledged and commented on by a 
number of scholars.2 This short essay of Derrida touches upon themes which relate to 
the founding and therefore also the functioning of all institutions, including that of a 
                                                 
1
 Jacques Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” in Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 46-54. This translation first appeared in Caucus for a New Political 
Science 15 (1986): 7-15. Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as DI. 
2
 A number of texts have dealt with Derrida’s essay. Although my analysis differs in various respect from these, I 
have benefited particularly from the reflections of Christopher Norris, Derrida (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 194-9; J. Claude Evans, “Deconstructing the Declaration: A Case Study in 
Pragrammatology,” Man and World 23 (1990): 175-89; B. Honig, “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and 
Derrida on the Problem of Founding a Republic,” The American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 97-113; 
Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 79-84; 
Patrick Hanafin, “Constitutive Fiction: Postcolonial Constitutionalism in Ireland,” Penn State International LR 
20 (2002): 339-61; Stewart Motha, “The Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law,” Law and Critique 13 (2002): 311-
38; Barry Collins, “The Belfast Agreement and the Nation that ‘Always Arrives at its Destination’,” Penn State 
International LR 20 (2002): 385-413; Noah Horwitz, “Derrida and the Aporia of the Political, or the Theologico-
Political Dimension of Deconstruction,” Research in Phenomenology 32 (2002): 156-176; John Cyril Barton, 
“Iterability and the Order-Word Plateau: ‘A Politics of the Performative’ in Derrida and Deleuze/Guattari,” 
Critical Horizons, 4 (2003): 227-64; Sascha Bischoff, Gerechtigkeit – Verantwortung – Gastfreundschaft: Ethik-
Ansätze nach Jacques Derrida (Freiburg: Switzerland, 2004), 175-178; and Peter Fitzpatrick, “‘What are the 
Gods to Us Now?’: Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8 (2007): 161-
90.  
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constitutional democracy. These themes include representation and delegation, the 
promise, the proper name, the signature, the event, time, place, the other, and 
responsibility. In addition, the essay refers to, but does not discuss, speech act theory, 
undecidability and différance. From the above it should already be clear that at least 
two caveats are called for in reading Declarations of Independence. Firstly, in order 
to understand what is at stake in this essay, it should not be read in isolation, but with 
reference to Derrida’s other texts which explore these themes in more detail. Such 
‘cross-referencing’ can also not be restricted to those texts of Derrida that overtly deal 
with the law as these texts themselves draw on ideas more fully developed in earlier 
and later texts.3 In analysing Derrida’s other texts the importance of inter alia 
language and psychoanalysis in his thinking should not be lost sight of.  
 
Secondly, account should be taken of one of the most challenging aspects of Derrida’s 
texts: the way in which he deals with the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics.4 
What is not always realised, and this danger is particularly acute in a short essay such 
as Declarations of Independence, is that Derrida in doing so does not simply overturn 
(or equalise) the existing hierarchy of concepts. Insofar as Declarations of 
Independence is concerned, it could easily be and indeed has been read as if Derrida 
simply seeks to de-legitimise state institutions by showing that the Declaration is 
performative (and not constative) in nature and that it is not the people who create 
the Declaration, but the Declaration that creates the people. Such a reading, by 
ignoring this caveat, would thus point to the groundlessness or self-authorising 
nature of a constitution. What Derrida does or what happens through his reading of 
texts is however that a further inscription takes place. In his texts Derrida relentlessly 
searches for and brings out the conditions of possibility of concepts. This leads to the 
invention of ‘non-concepts’ such as iterability, general writing or différance within 
which the concept(s) analysed are reinscribed.5 Another way of expressing this 
‘strategy’ is to say that Derrida seeks to show that every concept is inhabited by its 
other. The other is not here to be understood as a person or for example as writing 
which would be the ‘other’ of speech. The ‘other’ here refers to death and that which 
represents death. Derrida does this in order to show the life-death structure in very 
concept. This is to be compared with the metaphysics of presence which characterises 
Western philosophy and which construes concepts based on an ideal or pure 
structure where death and that which represents death is excluded as not belonging 
to the concept. Showing that the relation with death inhabits every concept is similar 
to inscribing a conceptual opposition within a ‘new concept’ – the new concept in 
                                                 
3
  Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 
1992), 3-67; Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” in Acts of Literature (New York: Routledge, 1992), 181-220; 
and Jacques Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration,” in For Nelson Mandela ed. 
Jacques Derrida and Mustapha Tlili (New York: Seaver Books, 1987), 13-42.  
4
 Jacques Derrida, Positions 2d ed (London: Continuum, 2002), 23, 38-39; Jacques Derrida “Signature Event 
Context,” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 329-30. 
5
 This is not to assert that deconstruction is a method, doctrine or general procedure. In an interview dating from 
1978, Derrida hesitantly described it as a nomadic war, a war “consisting of small clandestine operations”; see 
Freddy Tellez and Bruno Mazzoldi, “The Pocket-Size Interview with Jacques Derrida,” Critical Inquiry 33 
(2007): 386. 
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each instance gives expression to the relation with death. Derrida’s analysis6 of 
representation, the constative/performative, the signature, and the name, which are 
the most prominent themes in Declarations of Independence, illustrates this well and 
will be explored in more detail in what follows. This reading of Declarations of 
Independence can nevertheless, for reasons of space as well as for structural reasons,7 
not be an exhaustive one. Its modest aim is to suggest that there is much more to the 
essay than appears at first sight.  
 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMUNICATION OF MEANING 
 
For whom does one write, who accepts or refuses? For whom is this gift that never 
becomes present? 
Derrida Glas 808 
 
In constitutional theory today, and following from the United States and French 
revolutions, a constitution is predominantly viewed as a written document through 
which the people as sovereign and as the originating source of political power 
(pouvoir constituant) determine the way in which they will govern themselves.9 The 
written nature of a constitution is nevertheless not generally viewed as something 
which needs to be enquired into.10 It is mostly viewed as a fairly self-evident way in 
which to contribute towards legal certainty.11 The written nature of a constitution is 
sometimes more prosaically described as serving the function of a storehouse or 
memory (Speicher) of the consciousness, desires or meaning (Sinn) of a political 
                                                 
6
 I retain this word, which is perhaps not the most appropriate, using it in a specific sense. ‘Analysis’ usually has 
connotations of neutral ‘constative’ description, whereas Derrida’s ‘analyses’ are also of a performative and even 
pure or meta-performative nature, as we will see below; see also Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on 
Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 91-2.  
7
 See Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 31. 
8
 Jacques Derrida, Glas (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1986). 
9
 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die verfassunggebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff des 
Verfassungsrechts (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1986); Heinz Mohnhaupt and Dieter Grimm, 
Verfassung: Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart 2d ed (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2002), 100-41; Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Staatswissenschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), 157-60 (on internal 
and external sovereignty), 745-51; Jed Rubenfeld, “Legitimacy and Interpretation“, in Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations, ed. Larry Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 194-234. On 
the possibility of constitutions beyond a national state and a people; see inter alia Peter Häberle, Europäïsche 
Verfassungslehre (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 187-93; Tobias Herbst, Legitimation durch Verfassunggebung: 
Ein Prinzipienmodell der Legitimität staatlicher und supranationaler Hoheitsgewalt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2003), 177-81.  
10
 This does of course not imply that there has been no reflection in legal scholarship on the relation between 
language and law. A number of approaches have been developed including ones based on the ideas of classical 
speech act theory, which will be referred to in more detail below; see inter alia Timothy AO Endicott, “Law and 
Language,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman and Scott 
Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 935-68 for a discussion of some of these approaches and for 
further references. The implications of Derrida’s texts that deal with the privileging of speech and the denigration 
of writing in the metaphysical tradition have on my reading not as yet been adequately explored in the legal 
context. 
11
  See e.g. Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 20th ed, 
(Heidelberg: CF Müller, 1999), 14-5. 
  
4 
 
community,12 or as medium of the cultural self-positing of a people, a mirror to their 
cultural inheritance.13 These prosaic statements as well as those that simply stress the 
advantage of legal certainty, imply a distinction between semantic content and 
expression in language.14 They imply a notion of the sign where the signifier is 
structurally second to the signified.15 The language of a constitution is in other words 
traditionally viewed as an instrument that is used consciously, intentionally or 
purposively to express certain natural or self-evident ideas, such as the sovereignty of 
a people or a nation, the existence of a state, the protection of human or fundamental 
rights, the granting and (mutual) limitation of a variety of powers (pouvoirs 
constitués), and a certain idea of justice. These ideas or principles are regarded as 
existing beforehand and must simply be expressed or communicated in the most 
appropriate way. A constitution is in this way viewed as a vehicle or medium of 
unified meaning. Derrida’s Declarations of Independence can be read as complicating 
significantly, more so than has been realised, many of these seemingly self-evident 
ideas which express a specific philosophy of language. 
   
One of Derrida’s texts that spell this out most clearly is Signature Event 
Context.16 Derrida contends in this text that the traditional approach to 
communication is based on a specific idea of writing. In accordance with this idea 
people write because they have to or want to communicate their thoughts, ideas or 
representations.17 Writing is viewed in this sense as an extension of oral or gestural 
communication, the latter having inherent limits due to space and time.18 Writing 
thus serves as a different, technically more powerful vehicle, transport or site of 
passage for meaning, ideas or thoughts.19 It follows upon a pure presence. In writing, 
according to this model, the unity and integrity of meaning is not affected in its 
essence; should meaning be affected, this would be a mere accident. Stated 
differently, this model presupposes that writing does not in principle have the least 
effect on the structure or the content of the meaning, ideas or thoughts it is supposed 
to transmit.20 Derrida’s reference to Jefferson as merely the ‘secretary’ and 
‘draftsman’, as responsible for writing (not in the creative or initiating sense of the 
term), who cannot sign, as having been delegated “the task of drawing up what they 
[the delegates] knew they wanted to say” (DI 48, 52) must be understood in this 
                                                 
12
 Ulrich Haltern, “Internationales Verfassungsrecht? Anmerkungen zu einer kopernikanischen Wende,”   Archiv 
des öffentliches Recht 128 (2003): 532. 
13
 Häberle, supra n. 9, at 204. 
14
 Jacques Derrida, Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), 34.  
15
 Ibid., at 81. Derrida uses the term “mark” or “trace” rather than sign because of the sign’s metaphysical 
presuppositions - based on the notions of a signifier and a signified; see Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 
and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 138; Derrida, 
supra n. 4 (Positions) at 17-22. 
16
 For an excellent commentary, see Bischof, supra n. 2 at 123-55. 
17
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 312. 
18
 Ibid., at 311. 
19
 Ibid., at 309, 311. 
20
 Ibid., at 312. See also Derrida, supra n. 4 (Positions), at 21-2. 
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light.21 Jefferson plays the same subordinate role as Theuth (Thoth), the god of 
writing, in Plato’s Phaedrus, analysed by Derrida in Plato’s Pharmacy.22 On this 
view, “[w]riting thus only intervenes at a time when a subject of knowledge already 
possesses the signifieds, which are then only given to writing on consignment.”23 
 
The traditional model is based on a theory of communication which fails to 
investigate the structure of writing and which privileges speaking or the voice. This 
happens because of the fact that what is said seemingly does not cease to belong to 
the speaker, and because the sensible ‘body’ of the signifier seems to disappear in the 
act of speaking.24 This is directly related to the attempt made by metaphysics to 
domesticate, dissimulate and annul death.25 The seemingly self-present living act of 
speech appears not to “risk death in the body of a signifier that is given over to the 
world and the visibility of space”.26 Classical speech act theory does not examine the 
absence of the addressee (one writes for those that are absent) and of the sender from 
the marks he or she abandons and which continue to produce effects beyond his or 
her presence, which clearly happens in writing, but which is not restricted to 
writing.27 This ‘absence’ is traditionally understood as a continuous modification and 
progressive extenuation of presence. In the Declaration and in constitutional theory 
we see this in the notion of the people as ‘signatories’ or as (legitimising) origin of a 
constitution. Language in this model is thus understood as simply ‘supplementing’ 
presence. This ‘supplementation’ is not understood as involving a break in presence, 
but as “a continuous, homogenous modification of presence in representation”.28  
 
Derrida seeks to investigate the implications of the notion of absence which is 
such a clear feature of writing, but which, as noted above, and as he shows, does not 
remain restricted to writing in this sense. In order for it to function as writing, thus its 
condition of possibility, one’s written ‘communication’ must remain legible, iterable, 
or repeatable in the absolute absence and thus in the event of the death of every 
determined addressee in general.29 This structure also applies insofar as the sender or 
producer of written words is concerned. The disappearance, absence or death of the 
sender does not prevent in principle the sign from continuing to function, to be 
legible and to produce effects. The marks ‘signed’ by an author continue to function in 
                                                 
21
 See also Robert S. McDonald, “Thomas Jefferson’s Changing Reputation as Author of the Declaration of 
Independence: The First Fifty Years,” Journal of the Early Republic 19 (1999): 169-95. 
22
 See Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination (London: Continuum, 2004), 91-7. The role is 
nevertheless an ambivalent one, as will be indicated below. 
23
 Ibid., at 136, 153. 
24
  Derrida, supra n. 15, at 76, 77. 
25
 Derrida, supra n. 22, at 126; Derrida, supra n. 15, at 10, 54. 
26
 Derrida, supra n. 15, at 77-8. 
27
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 313. This loss of presence which occurs through writing has of course been 
part of the reason why writing has been condemned so often and consistently in the history of philosophy; see 
e.g. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974). See also Derrida, 
supra n. 4 (Positions), at 22-3. 
28
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 313. See also Derrida, supra n. 15, at 80-1; and Derrida, supra n. 14, at 26 
where he refers to this kind of approach as “a techno-semiotic, purely conventionalist and instrumentalist 
approach to language”. 
29
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 315-6. 
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his or her radical absence, thus also in the event of his or her death. Absence as a 
characteristic or rather condition of writing is not simply a modification of presence 
as is normally assumed – it constitutes a break with presence. The possibility of the 
death of the addressee as well as of the sender is inscribed within the structure of the 
mark.30 Writing, one could also say, leaves behind a mark which remains and which is 
iterable in the absence of and beyond the presence of the subject who produced or 
emitted it.31 This mark furthermore contains within itself a force which can break 
with every determined context, be it that of its producer or its own semiotic and 
internal context.32 This structure of being severed from the 
referent/signified/producer/addressee makes of every mark “the nonpresent 
remaining of a differential mark cut off from its alleged ‘production’ or origin”.33 
Iterability thus structures the mark of writing itself.34 The presence of a speaking 
subject, fully conscious to him or herself cannot therefore be that which makes 
possible the functioning of signs as is usually presumed by speech act theorists. Signs 
consequently cannot be viewed from this perspective. The same necessarily applies to 
constitutions. Signs (or rather marks) are not secondary, following upon a first 
immediate self-presence. Everything can be said to ‘begin’ with representation, and 
representation does not ‘belong’ to the subject; it ex-appropriates the subject from the 
beginning.35 The relationship with death is what makes the sign possible.36 This also 
applies to the ‘signs’ used in spoken communication and in ‘solitary mental life’.37 
This ‘law’ of communication is referred to by Derrida as general writing or iterability: 
the condition of possibility of all communication (which would include both speech 
and writing in the traditional sense).38 
 
Derrida in Signature Event Context thus seeks to explain how ‘signs’ and 
‘communication’ function.  What he shows there and also in his other texts is that 
language is ‘other’ to the speaker/sender/writer and the addressee.39 Language is not 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., at 316; and Derrida, supra n. 15, at 40, 93-7.  
31
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 317; and Derrida, supra n. 22, at 116. 
32
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 317. An essential feature of the mark is that it can function independent of 
the intention of the producer. Words or parts of words can furthermore be cut out from their original context and 
grafted into new contexts. This force of a mark is due to spacing which constitutes the written mark; the spacing 
which separates it from other elements of the internal contextual chain and also from present referents. 
33
 Ibid., at 318. This is necessarily tied to Derrida’s discussion of différance which engages inter alia with the 
contention of Ferdinand de Saussure that in language there are only differences without positive terms and that 
language is not a function of the speaking subject; see Derrida, “Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1-27.  
34
 See further Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 47-54 on this 
structural law. 
35
 Derrida, supra n. 15, at 45 note 4, 57 note 6. 
36
 Ibid., at 54. 
37
 See ibid., at 49-50, 56l; and Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 316-8. Also in the case of spoken communication 
this takes place by means of the unity of a signifying form, which in turn can only function as such because of its 
iterability – its ability of being repeated in the absence of its referent as well as in the absence of a determined 
signified or a present intention of signification.  
38
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 320. As Derrida, supra n. 22, at 91-7 read with fn 29 (at 173-4) reminds us, 
in Egyptian mythology, Thoth - the god of writing (who is also the son of the sun-god Ra, the secretary of Ra, a 
supplement to Ra, the nocturnal representative of Ra (the moon), the god of death, the god of non-identity) 
ultimately eclipses his father, becomes the god of the gods, the god thus also of the king, the father of speech. 
39
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 315. 
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something that can be possessed. Language, Derrida would say in a later text, is the 
language of the other; it returns to the other, exists asymmetrically, always for the 
other, kept by the other, coming from the other, the coming of the other.40 The ‘other’ 
should not be understood here as another person, but as we saw above, as the relation 
with death.41 Language has a separate ‘existence’.42 This does not however make it 
arbitrary and does not leave it at the mercy or choice of every user or interpreter. 
Language is structured by a law – in Signature Event Context referred to as 
iterability, in other texts as différance, the trace, etc. (DI 50). Iterability ‘is’, as shown 
above, necessarily related to death, a loss of ownership, a loss of control over meaning 
which can be said to inhabit the structure of the mark. In Force of Law Derrida shows 
through a reading of Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence how iterability is 
similarly a part of the structure of law.43 The ‘notion’ of iterability has a number of 
implications for the way in which a constitution is viewed, a few of which can be spelt 
out here. In the first place a constitution can no longer be understood in terms of the 
traditional model of communication – in other words, as a transportation of present 
meaning originating in the people. It also challenges the ideas of preservation and 
safe-keeping and also that of legal certainty which we saw above are usually 
associated with a constitution. These ideas are necessarily related to health, immunity 
and security.44 When a constitution is enacted, even when this happens in the mother 
tongue, ‘something radically other’ intervenes which no longer belongs to the 
people.45 This ‘something’, referred to in certain of Derrida’s other texts as 
autoimmunity, deprives them of control (which they never had in the first place) over 
the meaning of the constitution.46 A constitution in other words has no 
transcendental signified which can be anchored in the people, or in God, as we will 
see later. The first ‘law’ of a constitution is thus not that of the people as origin and 
point of return.47 ‘The people’ as signifying mark is merely an effect of iterability. A 
constitution can in other words function as a combination of signifying marks only 
due to iterability. It is therefore not untrue to say that a constitution is intended to 
communicate certain ideas or meaning. What we can term the ‘law’ of 
communication, of gesture, speech and writing, however shows that the 
communication of ideas and of meaning is a secondary effect of a constitution. The 
                                                 
40
 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 23-5, 40, 68. 
41
 See Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 18-9 on the pleasure and reality principles in Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. 
42
 In quotation marks because it is not a presence. 
43
 Derrida, supra n. 3 (“Force of Law”), at 38. See also Derrida, supra n. 22, at 126. 
44
 Derrida, supra n. 6, at 112. 
45
 Derrida, supra n. 40, at 34, 58. 
46
 See Derrida, supra n. 6; and Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the 
Limits of Reason Alone”, in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds., Religion (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 1-78; Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986 
and 1989), 96-7. 
47
 See e.g. Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power,” Constellations 12 
(2005): 238 who, referring to Carl Schmitt, describes democracy as the regime in which “the people is the 
subject of the constituent power and gives to itself its own constitution”. 
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‘law’ of the constitution48 or iterability, its condition of possibility, is in some of 
Derrida’s other texts elaborated on and related to incalculable justice, the perfect gift 
and absolute hospitality.49 All of these non-concepts are, like iterability, related to 
death, a loss of possession, a loss of subjectivity, a loss of mastery. They open up a 
constitution to that which goes beyond the limits of context and the horizon of 
meaning.50  
 
REPRESENTATION 
 
There are only representatives. Death is nothing. But its representatives are even 
less than nothing. And yet everything is written for Death, from Death, to the 
address of the Dead. 
Derrida Glas 78 
 
In Declarations of Independence, Jefferson is referred to as representing, in drafting 
the Declaration, the representatives of the people who do not yet exist at the time of 
drafting. The representatives furthermore had the right to revise, correct and ratify 
the draft prepared by Jefferson. The right to sign the Declaration belongs to the ‘good 
people’ who, Derrida notes, ‘declare themselves free and independent by the relay of 
their representatives and of their representatives of representatives’ (DI 49). They 
furthermore do so in the name of the laws of nature and of God, the creator of nature 
(DI 51). It is only through the signing of the Declaration that the people come into 
effect and that the representatives obtain their legitimacy (DI 50). If the people do not 
as yet exist at the time of the drafting of the Declaration, we may ask who the 
representatives actually represent at this stage. The same can be asked of God (DI 
53). In order to understand the notion of representation in Declarations of 
Independence it is necessary to refer to two other texts of Derrida where he explores 
this notion: Of Grammatology51 and To Speculate – On Freud.52 
 
In Of Grammatology Derrida explores the notion of representation through the 
writings of Rousseau. Rousseau, in contemplating the origin of language and society, 
shows his desire for presence through a critique of political representation. 
                                                 
48
 This “law” should obviously not be confused with the law in the sense of the legal system. See in this respect 
also Derrida, supra n. 3 (“Before the Law”), at 183 where he speaks of the law of law or the law itself which as 
the text makes clear, has to be brought into relation with iterability, différance, unconditional justice, etc in 
Derrida’s other texts. This is confirmed by Derrida, supra n. 3 (“Force of Law”), at 17. See also Derrida, supra n. 
3 (“Laws of Reflection”), at 22-29, 34, 37-8 where a superior law, also referred to as justice, the law of laws - a 
law which has not as yet presented itself - is invoked in the name of which Mandela challenges the apartheid 
legal system. 
49
 See Derrida, supra n. 3 (“Force of Law”), at 28; Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1992), Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000). 
50
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 310, 316. This should not be confused with plurality or masterable polysemy; 
see ibid., at 310; Derrida, supra n. 40, at 26. 
51
 Supra n. 27. 
52
 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 257-409. See also Jacques Derrida “Envoi” in Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other vol I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 94-128. 
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Representation, Rousseau contends, leads to the transformation of the general will or 
the sovereignty of the people into the will of only particular people, to the delegation 
of power and to legislation expressed in writing, inequality and the deprivation of 
freedom.53 The people in Rousseau’s model are the ultimate source of legitimacy and 
origin. Derrida contends that this view on political representation is closely linked to 
Rousseau’s views on language, which corresponds in this respect with the thinking of 
all Western philosophers since Plato.54 Rousseau, in a similar way as described in the 
previous section on traditional views regarding the constitution and communication, 
privileges speech as he sees it as an immediate representation of thinking; writing for 
Rousseau is a mere supplement of speech, a mediated representation of thinking.55 
Writing and representation are associated with death, loss of meaning, loss of self-
sameness, loss of autonomy, loss of property, and loss of freedom.56 Rousseau 
consequently condemns a number of forms of representation or supplements to 
nature: consonants (as opposed to vowels), servitude (as opposed to liberty, speech 
being the best expression of liberty), the theatre and actors (as opposed to the festival 
and the balls for young marriageable persons), political representation (as opposed to 
an electoral meeting of the freely assembled people).57 Representation is viewed by 
Rousseau and the whole of metaphysics, Derrida says, as the loss of an original 
presence, the loss of the self-presence of sovereignty.58 Representation is in other 
words an evil, an accident, a catastrophe that occurs to what is good, to a pure and 
self-sufficient origin.59 Rousseau consequently desires the disappearance of 
representation, the repression of the relationship with death.60  
 
Derrida however also shows a different logic at work in Rousseau’s texts, a logic 
which is not explicitly thematised. Rousseau in another context for example praises 
writing (hieroglyphic language) rather than speech as being able to represent 
immediate presence and regards writing as preceding speech, being part of nature 
rather than outside it.61 Something similar happens in the case of political 
representation. Rousseau not only condemns representation, but also, viewing it as a 
necessary evil, expects of it to restore presence.62 The representatives need to be 
changed often so as make their seduction more costly and more difficult, Rousseau 
says.63 With respect to speech and writing, Derrida explains this other logic in 
Rousseau’s texts with reference to the ‘violence’ of speech in that it penetrates into 
one violently and furthermore itself consists of a violence to or loss of presence of the 
object through the acoustic sign.64 In respect of political representation, Derrida 
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points out that even the social contract, which is supposed to precede representation 
and writing, is already characterised by representation and writing.65 With reference 
to what was said in the section above on constitutions and communication, we can 
say that the body politic already begins to die when it is born; it carries within itself 
the causes of its destruction.66 This furthermore corresponds with Rousseau’s 
acknowledgement that the state of nature is characterised by pure dispersion, inertia 
and indolence.67 Rousseau’s attempts at excluding writing from spontaneous 
assemblies of the people, is similarly unsuccessful, as Derrida shows.68 The 
characteristic of death in speech causes uneasiness in Rousseau and causes him to 
adopt contradictory positions, Derrida contends.69 We could also ask why presence 
requires an addition - in this case written and political representation - if presence 
was self-sufficient, if it did not already contain a ‘lack’ in itself. The acceptance of the 
need for writing and representation to restore presence can only be understood with 
reference to their role as substitutes, not of presence, but of a natural order that is 
deficient, that is, one that is already characterised by degradation or death.70 In other 
words, representation does not follow upon a pure presence; the desire for presence 
expressed by Rousseau is instead the result of the limitation, restriction or repression 
of absolute dispersion, of death.  
 
The above is another way of expressing the logic of différance, which Derrida 
deals with inter alia in To Speculate – On Freud. Derrida explores in this text the 
Freudian notion of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.71 Derrida refers 
in this respect to Freud’s description of the reality principle (PR) which, in Derrida’s 
words, acts as a delegate, slave, informed disciple or representative of the pleasure 
principle (PP). The reality principle sometimes, especially in sexual matters, under 
the influence of the ego’s (conservative) instincts of self-preservation, has to 
discipline the pleasure principle, thereby postponing satisfaction.72 Freud 
furthermore contends that the pleasure principle which supposedly reigns in the 
psyche is actually a secondary process. The primary process (pp) is dominated by the 
death drive, a desire to return to the inorganic state.73 This drive or instinct, in order 
for life to be possible at all, has to already restrain, limit or bind itself, independently 
of, but also in collaboration with the pleasure principle.74 The conservative drives 
which appear to serve the pleasure principle or to be the guardians of life are also or 
in the first place the satellites or couriers (Trabanten) of death; they seek not to keep 
the organism from death or to maintain the organism from death, but to avoid a 
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death that would not be its own.75 This ‘stricture’ of différance, or what we could refer 
to here as the double role of representatives, is extended by Derrida to every 
organism, organisation, corpus and movement.76 “Every being-together”, Derrida 
states, “begins by binding-itself, by a binding-itself in a differantial relation to 
itself”.77 What Derrida alludes to in Declarations of Independence, when he refers to 
Jefferson as representative of the representatives of the people, is that Jefferson and 
those he represented had a similar double role:  
 
If he [Jefferson] knew all this, why did he suffer so? What did he suffer from, this 
representative of representatives who themselves represent to infinity, up to God, 
other representative instances? 
It would appear that he suffered because he clung to his text. It was very hard for 
him to see it, to see himself corrected, emended, “improved,” shortened, especially 
by his colleagues. A feeling of wounding and mutilation should be inconceivable for 
someone who knows not to write in his own name, his proper name, but simply by 
representation and in place of another. If the wound is not erased in the 
delegation, it is because things are not so simple, neither the structure of the 
representation nor the procuration of the signature (DI 52). 
 
Derrida’s reference to Jefferson’s ‘suffering’ because he ‘clung to his text’ must 
furthermore be read with an interview of Derrida on Glas where he refers to the 
archi-psychoanalytic myth of Imre Hermann (and Nicholas Abraham) of the 
traumatic archi-event of de-clinging which constructs the human topical structure 
and which precedes the Oedipus complex.78 This archi-myth of clinging is for Derrida 
another way in which to give expression to the desire for absolute pleasure or the 
death drive. Although Jefferson and the other representatives therefore appear to be 
the representatives of the people, they are in the first place the ‘representatives’ of the 
death of the people, of dissemination, or of unconditional justice. The representatives 
are consequently no longer to be viewed as ‘representatives’ in the traditional sense, 
as what is ‘represented’ here (unconditional justice), cannot be brought to presence. 
The desire for presence expressed in the Declaration as well as in Rousseau’s writings, 
we could also say, is a consequence of the repression of this pre-origin; of the anguish 
of dispersion or dissemination.79  
 
SPEECH ACTS 
 
I give you – a pure gift, without exchange, without return – but whether I want this 
or not, the gift guards itself, keeps itself, and from then on you must-owe, tu dois. 
In order that the gift guard itself, you must-owe. 
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Derrida Glas 243 
 
In Declarations of Independence Derrida refers to the necessary undecidability 
between the constative and the performative. He asks the question whether the 
people, in so declaring themselves have already freed themselves (and are thus simply 
declaring or stating this) or whether they only become free through the signature (DI 
49). This is asked because, as Derrida points out, the people do not ‘exist’ as an entity 
before the Declaration. The people appear to give birth to themselves through the act 
of signature (DI 49-50). The representatives, when they ‘sign’ in the name of the 
people also only obtain this right or the legitimacy (to sign) retroactively (DI 50). The 
people, through the intervention of their representatives, thus give themselves a 
name, as well as the power, right or ability to sign, and they do so in the future perfect 
tense (DI 50). Derrida furthermore points out that through the Declaration another 
state signature was erased by dissolving the paternal or maternal link with the 
colonial country and that this dissolution similarly involves a structure which is both 
performative and constative (DI 50). 
 
Declarations of Independence does not fully explore, it only hints at Derrida’s 
other texts which deal with the performative/constative speech act distinction. The 
distinction between these speech acts is necessarily closely related to the concept of 
communication which was discussed above and which, as we saw, Derrida inscribes 
within iterability or general writing. A constative speech act is usually understood as 
consisting in saying or describing what exists. A performative speech act on the other 
hand is said to do something insofar as it is said. Examples of performative speech 
acts are promises, the naming of a ship, marrying, the making of a bet, and the giving 
of a gift.80 When I make a promise, according to the proponents of this distinction, I 
do not speak about an event, my speech act constitutes the event, brings about the 
event.81 In Declarations of Independence Derrida at first stresses the performative 
nature of the Declaration (itself pretending to be a constative speech act): “It 
performs, it accomplishes, it does what it says it does: this at least would be its 
intentional structure” (DI 47).82 One may be tempted to infer from this emphasis of 
Derrida of the performative nature of the Declaration (and from his later statement 
about the people not existing before the Declaration) that he wishes to question the 
legitimacy of this performative, to expose its vicious circularity, or that he wishes to 
emphasise the fact that a foundational origin (in this case God) is always needed. 
From the fact that Derrida describes this retroactivity, with reference to Francis 
Ponge, as ‘fabulous’ one might even be tempted to conclude the converse: that he 
praises in Arendtian fashion performatives of this nature (DI 50).83 Such readings 
would fail to engage adequately with Declarations of Independence. The ‘point’ 
                                                 
80
 Derrida, supra n. 4 (Margins), at 323. 
81
 Ibid., at 321. See also Jacques Derrida, “A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event” Critical Inquiry 
33 (2007), 441-61 at 446. 
82
 See also Derrida, supra n. 3 (“Laws of Reflection”), at 18, 19-20; Derrida, supra n. 14, at 32-3. 
83
 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963).  
  
13 
 
Derrida is making is a much more subtle and profound one. What he is saying is that 
viewing the Declaration as a performative that brings about a pure event84 is 
problematic because of the iterable structure of the mark. Because of its inscription 
within iterability a performative speech act can never be a pure event,85 in other 
words absolutely singular, a present and singular intervention, or ‘something’ that 
happens for the first and last time – it is always split, dissociated from itself.86 
Iterability necessarily limits what it makes possible, rendering its rigor and purity 
impossible.87  
 
Derrida furthermore relies on or makes temporary use of the traditional 
distinction between constative and performative speech acts (in spite of their 
instability) in order to bring to the fore the ‘notion’ of undecidability and of iterability 
(DI 47). The statement of Derrida that the undecidability between the performative 
and the constative structure produces the sought-after effect is of importance here 
(DI 49). In Signature Event Context, Derrida points out that the same sentence can 
be used on different occasions of utterance in both ways – performative and 
constative.88 This ‘confusion’ is provoked by iterability, the possibility of the 
repetition of the same sentence in different contexts and through grafting. One 
cannot therefore rigidly distinguish between constative and performative 
utterances.89 The ‘declarations’ of a Declaration also inevitably have a repetitive or 
citational structure. The ‘event’ of the Declaration is therefore always already split. It 
is (as a performative) always already inscribed within this structure of possibility 
(iterability).90 A performative speech act cannot function without this structure. The 
statement of Derrida about undecidability thus suggests that something which is not 
a ‘thing’ (and which as we saw above can be referred to as general writing or 
iterability), ‘precedes’ or makes possible the performative speech act which is the 
Declaration.91 This idea is explored further by Derrida in some of his other texts on 
law and justice. In Force of Law Derrida speaks of this ‘something’ as an overflowing 
of the performative, and in Specters of Marx as originary performativity.92 In Rogues 
Derrida elaborates further on the ‘notion’ of undecidability of the constative and 
performative touched on in Declarations of Independence: 
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Now, just like the constative, it seems to me, the performative cannot avoid 
neutralizing, indeed annulling, the eventfulness of the event it is supposed to 
produce. A performative produces an event only by securing for itself, in the first 
person singular or plural, in the present, and with the guarantee offered by 
conventions or legitimated fictions, the power that ipseity gives itself to produce 
the event of which it speaks – the event that it neutralizes forthwith insofar as it 
appropriates for itself a calculable mastery over it.93 
 
Another reason thus why a speech act such as a Declaration does not constitute an 
event is insofar as it is subject to the mastery of “I can, I may”.94 The notion of the 
performative is in traditional speech act theory necessarily tied to consciousness or to 
intention.95 This approach aims at ensuring and has the consequence “that no 
remainder escapes the present totalization”.96 In other words, it seeks to prevent 
marks from operating beyond the intention of the speaker or the original context 
within which the speech act was produced. Iterability necessarily entails that 
intention can no longer govern the scene of speech acts. This is because by virtue of 
iterability the intention animating an utterance is never purely present to itself, but 
rather always already dissociated from itself.97 For an event which is worthy of the 
name, both the constative and the performative must capitulate.98 Performativity, in 
its traditional meaning, always remains a legitimised or legitimising power, and it 
remains protective.99 For an event without sovereignty and without power to come 
about, the constative as well as the performative need to be exposed to another 
language - to a performative powerlessness.100 The latter could be said to be another 
name for the ‘other’ that iterability refers to – the ability of signs to function in the 
event of the death of the author/addressee. This is what happens to a people in a 
Declaration and which, as we saw above, can also be expressed in terms of the 
Freudian death drive. The Declaration thus finds itself within the paradoxical 
structure of the event. It seeks, without the intention, consciousness or sovereignty of 
its signatories to bring about the impossible event (as its condition of possibility) 
whereas it ‘succeeds’ only in bringing about the possible. The performative that is at 
stake here inevitably neutralizes the event.101 Yet the Declaration and all constitutions 
following in its wake, all Bills of Rights, in spite of the limitations imposed upon 
unconditional justice, continue and will continue to be haunted by the impossible 
which constitute a part of their structure, as their condition of possibility.102 
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It is necessary to return at this point to the notion of the promise.103 In 
Declarations of Independence, Derrida starts off by saying that he is not going to 
keep his promise of speaking about that which he was asked to speak about. He 
nevertheless undertakes to do so in the form of an excuse (DI 46). Is there any 
relevance in this side remark for constitutional theory? The answer would have to be 
a double ‘yes’.104 The promise, Derrida says, is the privileged example used by speech 
act theorists of a performative speech act, seeing that it involves the doing of 
something, an event.105 For Derrida however the promise is more than simply an 
example of a performative speech act. Every speech act, every sentence involves a 
promise, the promise of one’s own death, we could say with reference to Derrida’s 
explorations of the Freudian death drive. One could also say that the promise is the 
basic or general element of language or that all language is “in a certain way caught 
up in the space of the promise”.106 In Monolingualism of the Other Derrida explains 
as follows the structure of the arche- or messianic promise without proper content 
contained in language: 
 
An immanent structure of promise or desire, an expectation without a horizon of 
expectation, informs all speech. As soon as I speak, before even formulating a 
promise, an expectation, or a desire as such, and when I still do not know what will 
happen to me or what awaits me at the end of a sentence, neither who nor what 
awaits whom or what, I am within this promise or this threat – which, from then 
on, gathers the language together, the promised or threatened language, promising 
all the way to the point of threatening and vice versa, thus gathered together in its 
very dissemination.107 
 
This ‘originary’ promise is given in every constitution as its condition of possibility, 
although always lost, put in reserve, set aside, dissimulated, destroyed almost without 
remainder.108 This originary promise or ‘yes’ to the other, which is linked to death, a 
loss of property and absolute hospitality, tends therefore to end up in a betrayal, in a 
return primarily if not exclusively to the interests of the self, the people as ‘origin’, as 
sovereign. The promise in this unconditional sense, we could also say, inevitably ends 
up being corrupted in performative speech acts.109 The event is thereby neutralised, 
but as noted before it cannot completely exclude its being haunted by the other, the 
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impossible. This explains the ‘relevance’ of the opening statement of Declarations of 
Independence for constitutional theory. Every speech act is, as we now know, also a 
performative, and involves a betrayal of the promise and therefore the need for an 
excuse, a seeking of forgiveness.110 A constitution, we can say, promises more than 
what appears. A performative speech act inevitably belongs to the horizon of the 
masterable possible.111 The ‘origins’ of a constitution – and this is the point that needs 
to be emphasised – lies not in the people, but in the promise to the other, the 
overflowing of the performative, unconditional justice.112 This un-readability and 
untouchability of the constitutional text clearly holds important implications for 
constitutional interpretation.113 
 
THE SIGNATURE 
 
The stake of the signature – does the signature take place? where? how? 
why? for whom? 
 
Derrida Glas 3 
 
 “[W]ho signs, and with what so-called proper name, the declarative act that founds 
an institution?” asks Derrida (DI 47). Although Jefferson was the draftsman or 
‘writer’ of the Declaration, Derrida reminds us that he was not the signatory (DI 48). 
The representatives were also not ‘in principle’ the signers of the Declaration. 
Although they did factually ‘sign’ or adopt the Declaration in their own name, they 
also ‘signed for’ others (DI 48). As the Declaration indicates, the representatives 
‘signed’ in the name of the ‘good people’ (DI 49). It is therefore the ‘good people’ who 
actually ‘sign’ and declare themselves to be free and independent through their 
representatives. Derrida furthermore stresses the link between the signature and the 
constituting act of finding an institution and notes that in order for an institution to 
function as an institution it must both cut itself off from those empirical individuals 
who contributed to its founding and “maintain within itself the signature” (DI 47-8). 
These signatures are furthermore, according to the Declaration, guaranteed by yet 
other signatures. The people, in inventing for themselves a signing identity, ‘sign’ in 
the name of the laws of nature and in the name of God (DI 51). God, the creator of 
nature and the founder of natural laws, in effect guarantees the rectitude of popular 
intentions and of the unity and goodness of the people. God thus provides the ‘good 
people’ with the ultimate signature, confirming that they are (factually) and ought to 
be (legally) free and independent (DI 51-2). There are consequently only 
countersignatures in this ‘differantial’ process, Derrida notes, and he asks “Who signs 
all of these authorizations to sign?” (DI 51, 53) Something that has been pointed out 
by most commentators and which has already been referred to above is Derrida’s 
statement that “only in the act of signature” is birth given to the people “as possible 
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signer”. “The signature invents the signer”, he says (DI 49). Should one not take 
account of what was said above regarding writing, representation, performative 
speech acts, the promise, and the event, one could easily be misled by these 
statements and questions.  
 
Derrida enquires into the notion of the signature in a number of texts. The most 
often referred to in this respect is Signature Event Context.114 In classical speech act 
theory the signature, as well as the word ‘hereby’, play a role in writing similar to that 
of the presence of the speaker in the case of oral utterances.115 The signature therefore 
traditionally has the role of guaranteeing legitimacy, authority and meaning through 
a continuing presence.116 God, as we saw, is referred to in the Declaration as the final 
and ultimate signatory – the transcendental signified that assures presence and 
meaning (DI 52).117 In Signature Event Context Derrida contends that, similar to the 
position regarding speech and writing, the signature’s condition of possibility lies in 
its iterability. There can be no pure signature as an intentional fully present and 
singular speech act. In order to function, a signature must be iterable, imitable – it 
must be detachable from the intention of its production, also when the signatory 
dies.118 Once inscribed within or on the border of a text119 it becomes part of the text, 
and is due to the law of iterability with death as part of its structure set into the abyss, 
dispersed without return, and overflows itself.120 One could also say that inscribing 
the signature in the text “amounts to signing twice in the process of not signing any 
more”.121 Its iterability is in other words its condition of possibility. Its sameness, its 
repeatability, at the same time corrupts its identity and singularity and denies it a 
singular purity.122 The ‘seal’ of the signature is divided. This ties in with Derrida’s 
statement in Declarations of Independence that there are only countersignatures 
here. All signatures are already and every time they take place inscribed within a 
structure of iterability. They respond to and invoke at the same time an ‘originary’ or 
general signature, a counter-signature, the signature of the other.123 Elsewhere 
Derrida has compared the paradoxical event of signature with circumcision: 
 
The event is absolutely unpredictable, that is, beyond any performativity. That’s 
where a signature occurs. … [C]ircumcision is precisely something which happens 
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to a powerless child before he can speak, before he can sign, before he has a name. 
… This happened to him and leaves a mark, a scar, a signature on his body. This 
happened before him, so to speak.124 
 
The structure of the signature in Derrida’s elaboration thereof does not simply entail 
the active act of signature that creates the people as possible signer. Something else 
happens here. The signature is something that in the first place happens to a people. 
Their own signature, those of their representatives and that attributed to God, are 
simply countersignatures inscribed within the structure of iterability. Signing is 
countersigning; it is to say yes, in response to a first yes.125 It is an affirmation of both 
life and death.126 What gives rise to this gift of the Declaration to the self, this 
appearance of subjectivity, ‘is’ in other words the pure gift, the gift without return to 
the self.127 The signature does not have its origin in subjectivity (which is created only 
in the act of signature) but in a signature which does not belong to the order of 
signification.128 In signing, the signatures of the people, their representatives, and of 
God, thus keep nothing of all that they sign; the signatures are stolen (like flowers) in 
advance.129 The signatures are a part of the text; they operate as an effect within the 
text, a mere part of that which they claim to appropriate.130 The signature, viewed as 
such, necessarily implies that the text escapes what is traditionally viewed as the hold 
of the signatory on the signification of the text. The text is not simply the property of 
the signatory. Instead both the text and the signature are inscribed within a structure 
which entails the total absence of property, propriety, truth and sense.131 Signing thus 
constitutes a risk, but also a chance. It is here that the responsibility of the signatory 
begins as a response to the pure gift, as a response to the promise. This responsibility 
does not come to a halt in the act of constitution making; it is reinstituted each time 
‘effect is given’ to the constitution.  
 
THE PROPER NAME 
 
When Genet gives names, he both baptizes and denounces. He gives the most. 
…But a gift of nothing, of no thing, such a gift appropriates itself violently, 
harpoons, ‘arraigns’ [arraisonne] what it seems to engender, penetrates and 
paralyzes with one stroke [coup] the recipient thus consecrated. Magnified, the 
recipient becomes somewhat the thing of the one who names or surnames him, 
above all if this is done with a name of a thing. 
Derrida Glas 6 
 
                                                 
124
 Derrida, supra n. 93 (“Composing Circumfession”), at 21. 
125
 See Derrida, supra n. 78 (Points), at 367; Derrida, supra n. 104, at 279; Derrida, supra n. 114, at 54. 
126
 Jacques Derrida, “Living On,” in Harold Bloom et al, Deconstruction and Criticism (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004) 62 at 78-9. 
127
 See Derrida, supra n. 8, at 238-244 read with 1-6; Derrida, supra n. 114, at 96. 
128
 Derrida, supra n. 8, at 31-2. 
129
 See Derrida, supra n. 34, at 30-1; Derrida, supra n. 114, at 80-82; Derrida, supra n. 8, at 32 (“the flower, for 
example, inasmuch as it signs, no longer signifies anything”), also at 39. 
130
 Derrida, supra n. 8, at 4. 
131
 See ibid., at 239; Derrida, supra n. 114, at 56. 
  
19 
 
There is necessarily a close relationship between the signature and the proper name. 
This we already saw above in the primary question Derrida poses for discussion in 
Declarations of Independence (47): “[W]ho signs, and with what so-called proper 
name, the declarative act that founds an institution?” The representatives sign the 
Declaration for themselves but also in the name of and by the authority of the (good) 
people and ultimately in the name of God (DI 48-9). The invocation of the people and 
of God must be understood in the context of the political onto-theology of 
sovereignty, of the metaphysical desire for presence.132 By pointing to the people (of 
the United States) and ultimately to God, the Declaration seeks to invoke a presence 
and a ground in order to halt the play of signification. It attempts to ground the 
Declaration in proper names (with a fixed meaning and referent) outside of the act of 
language and writing which the Declaration is, unsoiled by the common.133 This also 
ties in with the anachronous (undecidable) desire of Jefferson (or of God) for the 
erection of his proper name that Derrida speaks of, illustrated by Jefferson’s 
suffering, his wounding, his mutilation, his exposure, his being put in question (DI 
52).134 There is no desire without aphoristic separation or without circumcision as we 
saw above; desire can only be posited by risking death.135 The proper name however 
seeks to be unique; it seeks to stand above language, seeks to avoid contretemps.136 
Yet the proper name never arrives by itself; it doesn’t come all alone.137 This is shown 
by the story of the hatter that Jefferson was told and which is recounted by Derrida; 
the ‘moral’ of the story being that a proper name is always shared (DI 53).  
  
The proper name is always already inscribed within a classification (and therefore 
a system of differentiation resulting in the obliteration of the proper), relating it 
therefore to the law of iterability.138 This also applies to the name of God which 
Derrida refers to as the ‘best’ name, “the name of the best name in general” (DI 52). 
The (best) name, he says, ought to be a proper name, but one “could not” replace 
“God” with “the best proper name” (DI 52). Jefferson knew this, Derrida says (DI 52). 
Had the Declaration referred thus to God, it would have shattered the illusion of an 
ultimate transcendental signified to secure meaning. But does it not happen 
nonetheless through its inscription in the text of the Declaration? And Jefferson may 
have known this too. God having deconstructed his own name at Babel, the proper of 
the proper name vanishes into the common.139 The proper name is a mark like any 
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other; it is immediately also improper, a common noun.140 Like any common noun it 
is imposed and therefore also immediately effaced, erased or expropriated through 
general writing, the originary violence of difference.141 In the same way in which 
language is structured by its possibility of functioning in the absence, in the event of 
the death of the sender and of the addressee, the proper name is structured by the 
possibility of functioning after the death of who it names.142 It lives on; it is destined 
to survive the subject.143 In this way one can say that it announces the subject’s 
death.144 The proper name is a death sentence, a contretemps which condemns to 
death whilst at the same time securing a delay, suspending death.145 The proper thus 
“comes only in its erasure. … It arrives only to erase itself”.146  
  
The ‘proper name’ of any people can consequently also be said to find its 
condition of possibility in iterability. The people only ‘exist’ within this paradoxical 
structure of death and delay; a structure of survival.147 This structure, this double law 
of the name, indicates the risk, but also the chance for an event, for unconditional 
justice.148 This necessarily ties in closely with the notions of sovereignty, the nation 
state, freedom, equality, and reason, elaborated on by Derrida in Rogues. The notions 
of the people and of democracy in their current manifestations are, he tells us there, 
tied together with sovereignty, freedom as power, calculable equality, and the reason 
of the strongest. Reason thus conceived finds its origin in itself, it auto-positions 
itself, it collects itself, gathers itself, performatively gives itself the right to reason.149 
Derrida however contends that sovereignty (in spite of its claims to purity and 
indivisibility), as is the case with the proper name, and because of its belonging to 
language and the need for it to be clothed with meaning, is necessarily shared, 
divided and partitioned, thereby compromising itself.150 Through a reading of Plato 
and Aristotle, he furthermore shows how the concept or name of democracy, in the 
sense of the power or sovereignty of the people, is made possible by a certain 
indetermination, lack of proper meaning, a certain freedom of play of democracy, an 
autoimmunity, in other words, by the democracy to come. This strips the sovereignty 
of the people of its claim of origin.151 Similarly freedom, equality, and reason are 
shown, through a reading of Plato, Aristotle, Nancy, Kant and Husserl, to find their 
condition of possibility respectively in incalculable, an-economic, power-less 
freedom, equality, and reason.152 Every state, and therefore also every legitimate 
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constitutional democracy, Derrida concludes, is ‘properly’ speaking, a rogue state, 
because of its essential link with sovereignty and because of its failure (albeit a 
necessary or inevitable failure) to give effect to the incalculable; the United States and 
its allies (mostly western constitutional democracies) with their foreign policy of 
calling other states rogue states, in violating international law, in abusing power, even 
more so than others.153 
 
SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Declarations of Independence calls on us to read differently. It calls on us to conceive 
differently of the notion of a constitutional democracy. The ontological question, 
asking what constitutional democracy is, its essence or its function, necessarily 
implies an answer presupposing presence.154 Constitutional democracy should no 
longer be viewed in terms of the circular turning of a wheel – the people giving 
themselves a foundational document in order to rule themselves, giving themselves 
reason and rights in sovereign fashion. This wheel is also a free wheel,155 a 
dissymmetrical contract which does not return to itself.156 This is indicated by an 
analysis of the inscription in writing of a constitution, the performative speech act 
which seems to institute it, its signatures, and its proper names. Constitutional theory 
has no choice but to engage with the structure of language which is its very condition 
of possibility. As Derrida has stated regarding the Declaration of the Rights of Man, it 
“implies a philosophy … but also a philosophy of philosophy, a concept of truth and 
its relations to language”.157 Language cannot however be viewed within a 
philosophical model of speech as presence and of writing as a mere extension of 
speech. Such a model of language, apart from being based on a philosophy of 
presence, would have the result of a repeated neutralisation of the text of a 
constitution, of the irresponsible unfolding of a programme, of doing only the 
possible. If the inscription of a constitution within general writing, iterability, the 
overflowing of the performative, unconditional justice, and the democracy to come is 
affirmed (and thus no longer forgotten, repressed, unthought), only then does 
constitutional theory stand a chance of confronting responsibly questions about its 
interpretation and application, its principles, values and fundamental rights. This 
responsibility, called for by the impossible, extends beyond the boundaries of 
national states and of regional unions as well as beyond humanity. It puts in question 
meaning, application, principles, values, citizenship and human rights. It calls for the 
hospitable exposure to the event, without the domination and neutralization of 
performative mastery and sovereignty, without alibi. 
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